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Rafael Ferber
MORTALITY OF THE SOUL AND 
IMMORTALITY OF THE ACTIVE MIND 
(ΝΟΥΣ ΠΟΊΗΤΊΚÓΣ) IN ARISTOTLE. 
SOME HINTS
For Aristotle – at least in the dialectical context of the Sophistici Elenchi – “most people 
have no distinct opinion (ἀμφιδοξοῦσιν) whether the soul of animals is destructible or 
immortal” (SE 17.176b16-17; transl. Pickard -Cambridge). In the same vein, we could say 
that even today many, or perhaps even most, people have no distinct view of whether 
the soul of human beings, that is, their own soul, is destructible or immortal. Aristotle 
himself, by contrast, had developed, in the context of De Anima, a distinct view, namely 
that the soul of human beings is destructible, except for the active mind (νοῦς ποιητικóς). 
The paper gives (I) a short introduction to Aristotle’s theory of the soul in distinction 
to Plato’s and tries again (II) to answer the question of whether the individual or the 
general active mind of human beings is immortal by interpreting “When separated 
(χωρισθεìς)” (de An. III, 5, 430a22) as the decisive argument for the latter view. This 
strategy of limiting the question has the advantage of avoiding the probably undecidable 
question of whether this active νοῦς is human or divine. The paper closes with an outlook 
(III) on the Christian belief in the resurrection of body and soul in a spiritual body (σῶμα 
πνευματικóν) (1 Corinthians: 15, 44) by accentuating the ethical aspect of the belief in 
individual immortality as a “need of reason” (Vernunftbedürfnis) (Kant, Critique of 
Practical Reason, A 256–258).
I
What is rather astonishing in the relation of Aristotle (384 BC-322 BC) to Plato (428/427 
BC-348/347 BC) seems to me the following: Aristotle entered the Academy at about the 
age of seventeen or eighteen (368/367 BC) and “attached himself to Plato and stayed with 
him (παραβαλεῖν δὲ Πλάτωνι καὶ διατρῖψαι παρ᾽ αὐτῷ) twenty years” (D/L, V, 9, 18-19; 
l. 105, Dorandi, cf. Vita Marciana: 60-64, FGRHist 328 F 223). Aristotle “stayed” so 
with Plato in Athens from 368/367 until Plato’s death in 348/347 BC – if he not “seceded 
(ἀπέστη) [also in a spatial sense] from Plato when Plato was still alive” (D/L, V, 2, 1). We 
may not conclude, but guess from the words “attached himself to Plato and stayed with 
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him” that he “stayed” also as a member of the Academy for circa twenty years.1 But we 
do not know anything exact about his membership. It may even be the case that he was 
not always present at Athens.2 Although his writings invite us to form a picture of him,3 
his “scientific works are almost silent about his personal affairs.”4 In contrast, Plato’s 
dialogues contain at least three overt allusions (cf. Ap. 34a, 38b, Phd. 59b) and probably 
many covert ones (cf. e.g. Symp. 217a) about their author.5 This silence of Aristotle’s is 
especially true with regard to the form of his membership in the Academy.
Nevertheless, during, or rather shortly after, his supposed “membership” in the 
Academy from 368/367 until 348/347 BC,6 Aristotle criticized Plato’s ontology – the theory 
of transcendent ideas, as e.g. developed in the Phaedo: “Further, of the more accurate 
arguments, some lead to Ideas of relations, of which we say there is no independent class....” 
(Metaph. A9.990b16; transl. Ross/Barnes). This implies a critique of the Phaedo, where an 
idea of a relation – the idea of the equal – is introduced for the first time (Phd. 74a, c, e, 
75b, 78d).7 Aristotle developed – despite his well -documented acquaintance with Plato’s 
Phaedo (Metaph. A 9, 991b3-7; GC. B 6, 335b10-14) – his own psychology, which negates 
the immortality of the soul.
In contrast, “the Socrates in the Phaedo” (ὁ ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης) 
(GC. B9.335b10-14; cf. Pol. B 2, 1261a6) developed four proofs for the immortality of the 
soul (Phd. 69e-72d; 72e-77d: 80b-80c; 105c -e; 105c-107a), but even the “final proof,” which 
consists of two parts – a first sub -proof that the soul, since it is the cause of life in the 
body, is immortal (Phd. 105c -e) and a second sub -proof that the soul, since it is immortal, 
is indestructible (Phd. 105e-107a) – did not convince him completely (Phd. 107b).8 In any 
1 Cf. O. Gigon (ed.), Vita Aristotelis Marciana (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1962): “Daraus ergibt sich u.a. klar, dass 
Philochoros zwei feste Data besessen hat: das Lebensalter des Aristoteles mit 63 und die Dauer seiner Zugehörigkeit 
zur Akademie mit 20 Jahren. Über diese Grunddata wird der Historiker (gest. um 260) als jüngerer Zeitgenosse 
Theophrasts (gest. 286) zuverlässig Bescheid gewusst haben.”
2 Cf. ibid., 43, ad l. 37-40: “Freilich ist auch so vor der Überschätzung der Angabe zu warnen. Sie bedeutet 
zunächst keineswegs, dass Aristoteles von 367 bis 347 ununterbrochen in Athen weilte, sondern nur, dass er von 
367 an ‚eingeschriebenes Mitglied’ der Akademie war...”
3 Cf. A.-H. Chroust, “Aristotle’s ‘Self -Portrayal’,” in id., Aristotle, New Light on His Life and Some of His 
Lost Works, I (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), 232-248; C. Natali, Aristotle: His Life and School, 
ed. D.S. Hutchinson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 120-144.
4 C. Natali, Aristotle: His Life and School, op. cit., 20. For a portrayal, cf. A.-H. Chroust, “Aristotle’s ‘Self-
 -Portrayal’,” op. cit., 232-248.
5 Cf. R. Ferber, “Panta prattein. Socrate e il bene nella Repubblica,” Méthexis 23 (2010), 91-92.
6 Cf. W. Jaeger, Aristoteles. Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung (Berlin: Weidmannsche 
Buchhandlung, 1923), 177: “Voraussetzung der Ideenkritik in ihrer ursprünglichen Gestalt ist also ein Kreis 
platonischer Philosophen, vor dem Aristoteles nach dem Tode des Meisters noch einmal alle Einwände gegen 
dessen Lehre in schnellem Überblick zusammenfasst, die im Lauf der Jahre die Akademie beschäftigt hatten (...). 
Einen solchen Platonikerkreis hat Aristoteles nach Platons Tod ausser in Athen, das er bald verliess, nur einmal in 
Assos um sich gehabt und dann niemals wieder.”
7 Cf. W.D. Ross (ed.), Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A revised text with introduction and commentary by D. Ross 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), 194, ad loc.
8 Cf. R. Ferber, “Deuteros Plous, the Immortality of the Soul and the Ontological Argument for the Existence 
of God,” in Proceedings of the XI Symposium Platonicum, Plato’s Phaedo, Brasilia, 6th to 8th July 2016, 
International Plato Studies (Baden -Baden: Academia Verlag, 2018), 221-230, esp. 229-230. Russian translation: 
“Deuteros Plous: The Immortality of the Soul and the Ontological Argument for the Existence of God” (tr. 
A. Garadja) = “Deuteros plous: бессмертие души и онтологический аргумент существования Бога” (пер. 
А. Гараджи), Платоновские исследования, VIII (2018), 11-33.
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case, the author of the Phaedo, Plato, did not return to the proofs in the Phaedo but did 
develop three other proofs (cf. R. 610e-611a, Phdr. 245b-246a, Lg. 894e-895c, 896a -b). 
Aristotle seems not convinced by any of them, inter alia because arguments in Phdr. 
245b-246a and Lg. 894e-895c, 896a -b, rely on the self -motion of the soul,9 a contradictory 
concept (cf. Phys. VIII.5.57b26-258a5).
It is true that Aristotle wrote a Platonizing dialogue, Eudemus, “in 353 or shortly 
thereafter,”10 from which only fragments survive.11 But here he may be expressing, in 
the face of Eudemus’ early death in 353 in the form of a consolatio mortis, his solidarity 
with his “classmate” Eudemus of Cyprus and his teacher Plato rather than developing his 
own theory. This is indicated by the fact, that – if not – he would in the year 353 “adhere 
doctrinally to the philosophic doctrines on the soul advanced in the Phaedo – doctrines 
which by 353 were obviously ‘antiquated’ even for Plato.”12
But it is evident from De Anima, written probably “after Aristotle’s return 
to Athens in 325-4,”13 that Aristotle is not convinced by the arguments of the Phaedo 
for the immortality of the individual soul nor by later arguments: “All, however, that 
these thinkers do is to describe the specific characteristics of the [individual] soul; they 
do not try to determine anything about the body which is to contain it, as if it were 
possible, as in the Pythagorean myths, that any soul could be clothed in any body – an 
absurd view, for each body seems to have a form and shape of its own” (de An. 407b20-
24; transl. Barnes).
Aristotle denies especially one presupposition of the Platonic psychology: the 
existence of the individual soul as a substance that is independent from the body, of which 
substance predicates can be predicated as e.g. ἀσύνθετον (cf. Phd. 78C3), ἀθάνατόν τε καὶ 
ἀνώλεθρον (Phd.88b5-6, cf. Phd.95b9-c1.106d2-9).
. For Aristotle, whereas in the Eudemus the soul seems to be an εῖδóς τι (frg. 46, 
52, 29 Rose14), it is in De Anima an εῖδός τινος, namely the something of a body (σώματος 
δέ τι), without which it cannot exist (cf. de An. II.2.414a20-23).
For Plato, on the other hand, there is a hierarchical ordering of reality in the 
following sense: The individual ideas can exist without sense phenomena, but sense 
phenomena cannot exist without the individual ideas. In the same way: The individual 
soul can exist without a (living) body and surely without this or that human body, but 
this or that human body cannot exist without the individual soul. This ontological 
9 Cf. for a formal reconstruction of the argument in the Phaedrus, R. Ferber, Philosophische Grundbegriffe 2, 
Mensch, Bewusstsein, Leib und Seele, Willensfreiheit, Tod (München: C. H. Beck, 2003), 129. Translation into Polish 
by T.L. Kusak, A. Węgrzecki, Podstawowe Pojęcia Filozoficzne 2 (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo WAM, 2008), 123.
10 A.-H. Chroust, “Eudemus or on the Soul: A Lost Dialogue of Aristotle on the Immortality of the Soul,” 
Mnemosyne: Bibliotheca Classica Batava, vol. 19 (1966), 17-30, here 20, repr. in id., Aristotle, New Light on His 
Life and Some of His Lost Works, II (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), 43-54.
11 Cf. O. Gigon (ed.), Aristotelis opera, III, Libroum deperditorum fragmenta (Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 
1967), 287-296.
12 Chroust, ibid., 29, n. 2.
13 W. D. Ross (ed.), Aristotle. De anima, edited, with introduction and commentary by D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1961), 11.
14 Cf. W. Jaeger, Aristoteles, op. cit., 44, n. 3
1352018
MORTALITy OF THE SOUL AND IMMORTALITy OF THE ACTIvE MIND (νοῦς Ποιητικóς) IN ARISTOTLE. SOME HINTS
“Hysteron -Proteron -Structure” (cf. Met. V11.1019a2-4), the “fundamental formula of 
Platonism,” can be understood also as the “fundamental formula” of Plato and his so-
 -called objective idealism.15
Unlike Plato, Aristotle does not regard the εῖδος as an independent entity, but 
only as a dependent predicate: “For it seems impossible that any universal term should 
be the name of a substance” (Metaph. Z13.1038b8-9; transl. Ross). Since I have provided 
an extended discussion of Aristotle’s theory of substance elsewhere,16 I will summarize 
here only some essentials: The first, or concrete, substance is something particular, and 
only the so -called second, or abstract, substance is something universal (cf. Cat. 2a14-16). 
The universal which is said of the particular has no independent existence, but is only 
a quality of that particular. For example, when we say “Socrates is a human being,” we 
refer to a quality of a particular individual, namely the quality of being human or the fact 
of being a member of the human species. But being human, or a member of the human 
species, does not mean a particular individual, say, the visible flesh -and -blood Socrates. 
Rather, it is a quality which distinguishes the human species from others. The Aristotelian 
substance is – to use an expression of Donald C. Williams (1899-1983) – the “occurrence 
of an essence” in a particular individual.17 We can mentally perceive this universal quality 
in a similar way as we remember or “see” the Platonic ideas. Thus, by a kind of induction, 
we see in Socrates something universal, namely a human being: “Thus it is clear that it 
is necessary for us to become familiar with the primitives (τὰ πρῶτα) by induction; for 
perception too instils the universal in this way” (An. post. B 19, 100b4-5). In the same vein, 
we could say that the soul is the “occurrence of an essence” in an individual body, or – 
to recall the Aristotelian definition of the soul, which became famous under the heading 
of anima forma corporis – “Hence the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form 
of a natural body having life potentially within it. But substance is actuality, and thus soul 
is the actuality of a body as above characterized” (de An. 412a19-22). Therefore: As soon 
as the individual body dies, also the form of the body dissolves with the body. We have 
not an ontological priority of the soul over the body in the sense of the above -mentioned 
Platonic “Hysteron -Proteron -Structure,” but a coexistence with the body: This or that soul 
cannot exist without this or that particular living body and this or that living body cannot 
exist without this or that soul.
15 Cf. H. Krämer, “Die Idee des Guten. Sonnen- und Liniengleichnis (Buch VI 504a-511e)” in Platon, Politeia, 
ed. O. Höffe (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1996), 179-203, here 200: “Man kann sie geradezu als Grundformel des 
Platonismus verstehen.” Quoted in R. Ferber, “Auf diese Weise nun gebe ich selbst meine Stimme ab” – Einige 
Bemerkungen zu Platons später Ideenlehre unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des ‘Timaios’,” Gymnasium. 
Zeitschrift für Kultur der Antike und Humanistische Bildung, vol. 105 (1998), 419-444, here 436, n. 39. Cf. 
R. Ferber, Philosophische Grundbegriffe 2, op. cit., 129-131 (Polish translation: Podstawowe Pojęcia Filozoficzne 
2, op. cit., 122-125).
16 R. Ferber, “Die ‘metaphysische Perle’ im ‘Sumpf der Tropen’: Einige Bemerkungen zur aristotelischen 
Metaphysik, Z 17, 1041b 4-9,” in Metamorphosen der Vernunft: Festschrift für Karen Gloy, ed. A. Lazzari 
(Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2003), 63-82, esp. 70.
17 D.C. Williams, “The Elements of Being,” Review of Metaphysics, vol. 7 (1953), 3-18, here 7: “Santayana, 
however, used ‘trope’ to stand for the essence of an occurence and I shall divert the word, which is almost useless 
in either his or its dictionary sense, to stand for, so to speak, the occurrence of an essence.” Quoted in Ferber, “Die 
‘metaphysische Perle’ im ‘Sumpf der Tropen’,” op. cit., 74.
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II
But there is an exception to this coexistence: If the soul is mortal, the whole genus νοῦς 
is not. Concerning the genus νοῦς, Aristotle makes a new and interesting distinction, 
namely the distinction between two species: the passive (νοῦς παθητικός) and the active 
mind (νοῦς ποιητικóς). Although Aristotle does not use the expression (νοῦς ποιητικóς), 
but speaks only of another “thought (νοῦς),” “which is what it is by virtue of making 
(ποιεῖν) all things,” I use it just for convenience and in respect of a long tradition. I quote 
here from the decisive passage:
And in fact thought (νοῦς), as we have described it, is what it is by virtue 
of becoming (γίνεσθαι) all things, while there is another which is what it is 
by virtue of making (ποιεῖν) all things: this is a sort of positive state like the 
light; for in a sense light makes (ποιεῖ) potential colours into actual colours. 
Thought in this sense of it is separated (χωριστός), impassible (ἀπαθής), 
unmixed (ἀμιγής), since it is in its essential nature activity (for always the 
active is superior to the passive factor, the originating force to the matter). 
Actual knowledge is identical with its object: in the individual, potential 
knowledge is in time prior to actual knowledge, but absolutely it is not prior 
even in time. It does not sometimes think (νοεῖ) and sometimes not think 
(οὐ νοεῖ). When separated (χωρισθεìς) it is alone just what it is, and this 
alone is immortal (ἀθάνατον) and eternal (ἀΐδιον) (we do not remember 
because, while this is impassible (ἀπαθές), passive thought (παθητικòς νοῦς) 
is perishable); and without this nothing thinks (νοεῖ). (de An. III.5.430a14-26; 
transl. Smith/Barnes with modifications by R.F.).
The passage has a long history of interpretation: The decisive documents from 
Theophrastus (c. 371-c. 287 BC) to Stephanus from Alexandria (7th century) have recently 
been collected by H. Busche and M. Perkams.18 In the Middle Ages, Averroes (1126-1198) 
and Aquinas (1224-1274), especially, commented on the chapter but, as W.D. Ross remarks 
rightly, “neither of these confined himself to a strict interpretation of the chapter; they 
incorporated into their theories elements which belong to Moslem or to Christian theology 
rather than to Aristotle.”19 We find a useful survey of ancient and medieval and nineteenth-
 -century accounts of the agent intellect in Brentano’s “Habilitationsschrift” “Die Psychologie 
des Aristoteles inbesondere seine Lehre vom Νοῦς ποιητικóς.”20 The interpretation of 
F. Brentano is nevertheless biased in favour of Aquinas and its interpretation of the νοῦς 
ποιητικóς as created by God has been sharply criticized by H. Busche.21 The present status 
18 H. Busche and M. Perkams (eds.), Antike Interpretationen zur aristotelischen Lehre vom Geist (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner, 2018).
19 W.D. Ross (ed.), Aristotle. De anima, 44.
20 F. Brentano, Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom Νοῦς ποιητικóς (Mainz: Verlag von 
Franz Kirchheim,1867), 5-36.
21 Cf. ibid., 226: “Fragen wir aber, welcher von den früheren Erklärungsversuchen am Meisten der Wahrheit nahe 
gekommen, so ist es unläugbar, dass wir dem heil. Thomas von Aquin diese Ehre zuerkennen müssen. Ja, ich 
weiss nicht, ob ich nicht sagen soll, das er die ganze Lehre des Aristoteles richtig erfasst habe.” Cf. for a critique: 
H. Busche, Die Seele als System, Aristoteles Wissenschaft von der Seele (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2001), 67-96, 
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quaestionis may be consulted in the corresponding chapter of C. Shields on De Anima and 
a summary of it in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
I cannot give here again a survey on the long history of interpretation, “a substantial 
field in its own right,”22 but rely on C. Shields. He distinguishes correctly, in a typological 
manner, between a human and a divine interpretation, and enumerates the pros and cons of 
these two interpretations. In addition to the divine and human interpretation, I distinguish 
between a general and an individual interpretation and I enumerate in a simplified chart 
the following essential options:
Divine Interpretation Human Interpretation
General Interpretation Individual Interpretation
Roughly stated: Whereas Theophrastus defends the human and individual 
interpretation, Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. 200), e.g., seems to defend the divine and 
general interpretation. Thomas Aquinas defends the human and individual interpretation, 
Averroes the general and divine. But since the text is too underdetermined to rule out 
either the divine or the human interpretation, intersubjective agreement is difficult, if not 
impossible, to reach, as more than two thousand years of interpretation confirm.23
So, I limit myself, first, to the question: Is the active mind (νοῦς ποιητικóς) 
individual or general? I leave the question open as to whether this νοῦς is divine or human.
To answer this limited question, I limit myself, second, to another limited question: 
What is the subject of “When separated (χωρισθεìς) it is alone just what it is, and this alone 
is immortal (ἀθάνατον) and eternal (ἀΐδιον)” (de An. III, 5, 430a22-23)?
This small question can, in my opinion, be unanimously answered: It is the νοῦς 
ποιητικóς which is separated, because the expression “When separated (χωρισθεìς)...” 
(430a22) reassumes: “Thought in this sense of it is separated (χωριστός)” (430a17).24
This is the hypothesis I start from. From this hypothesis, it follows, first, that the 
νοῦς ποιητικóς is separated (χωριστός). We do not remember it because before our birth, 
we did not have a νοῦς παθητικός and therefore the νοῦς ποιητικóς did not find before 
esp. 147 and 91, n. 177. I agree especially with Busche’s critique of Brentano’s thesis that we find in Aristotle an 
immortal individual soul, cf. F. Brentano, Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, op. cit., 122, n. 45: “Dass die Seele, wenn 
sie nach der Trennung vom Leibe fortbesteht, etwas Individuelles bleibt, ist unzweifelhaft, den das Allgemeine 
besteht nach Aristoteles ausserhalb des Denkens nicht anders als in Individuen (vgl. Anal. Post. I, 11. Princ.) 
Ebenso ist offenbar, dass sie noch dasselbe Individuum sein muss (...).” This coincides with the interpretation of 
Thomas Aquinas, “that a distinct agent intellect belongs to each human being, severing at death to exist on its own 
immortally” (V. Caston, “Aristotle’s Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal,” Phronesis, 54 (1999), 199-227, here 207).
22 V. Caston, “Aristotle’s Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal,” op. cit., 209-211 and 200, n. 11.
23 Cf. Ch. Shields (ed.), Aristotle De Anima (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 312-313, 328-329.
24 To quote paradigmatically here only two clear testimonies from the last century: W.D. Ross (ed.), Aristotle. De 
anima, 47, writes: “The unnamed subject of the present sentence is plainly the active reason (cf. χωρισθεìς, l. 22, 
with χωριστός s, l. 17).” L. Robin, Aristote (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1944), 203, has written: “Ainsi, 
l’intellect ‘en acte’ paraît être à la foi quelque chose en dehors de nous, et quelque chose en nous. Par suite, à la 
fois, il est ‘séparé’, χωριστός, et il se ‘sépare’, χωρισθεìς: et c’est quand il s’est de la sorte séparé de nous qu’ il a sa 
veritable ‘quiddité.’”
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our birth any εῖδος or immanent form from sensible things, which we could remember 
from the time before our birth. The last sentence, “and without this (ἄνευ τούτου) nothing 
thinks” (de An. III, 5, 430a25), can now have two interpretations: Either without the νοῦς 
ποιητικóς nothing thinks or without the νοῦς παθητικός nothing thinks. Since the νοῦς 
ποιητικóς, as separated νοῦς, thinks anyway and incessantly, and the “this” in “without 
this” (ἄνευ τούτου) refers therefore to the νοῦς παθητικός, we can conclude: Without the 
νοῦς παθητικός, nothing thinks. The νοῦς παθητικός is thus the necessary but not sufficient 
condition of our thinking. This is also implied by the thesis that our soul “never [thinks] 
without mental images” (de An. III.7 431a.16-17). But the νοῦς παθητικός which receives 
images of sensible things is a personal one.
The question now remains: Is this νοῦς ποιητικóς also individual, or is it general 
and impersonal? When it is mixed with the νοῦς παθητικός, the νοῦς ποιητικóς is also 
individualized or personalized because it finds the mental images which the individual 
παθητικòς νοῦς receives through our sensory organs. After the death of the body and 
its παθητικòς νοῦς, the ποιητικòς νοῦς survives only as “impassible” (ἀπαθές) and is, 
therefore, immortal only in a depersonalized or deindividualized form, because it now 
has no personal mental images to work on.
So, the answer to our limited question is: The active mind is immortal only in 
a deindividualized general form; but when it is mixed with the passive mind and its 
mental images, it also exists in a “mixed” form and it is mortal only in this “mixed” 
form, as the passive mind. To spell the decisive sentence out: “When separated 
(χωρισθεìς) it is alone just what it is, and this alone is immortal (ἀθάνατον) and eternal 
(ἀΐδιον)” (de An. III.5 430a22-23): When   the νοῦς ποιητικóς is separated (χωρισθεìς), it 
is solely just what it “essentially”25 is and, therefore, is not individualized by images, and 
this deindividualized νοῦς ποιητικóς alone is immortal (ἀθάνατον) and eternal (ἀΐδιον).
Although we have no ontological priority of the soul over the body, in the sense 
of the above -mentioned Platonic “Hysteron -Proteron -Structure,” but a coexistence with 
the body, we have nevertheless a modified and weakened Platonic “Hysteron -Proteron-
 -Structure” concerning the νοῦς ποιητικóς and the νοῦς παθητικός: The νοῦς ποιητικóς 
can exist without the νοῦς παθητικός, but the νοῦς παθητικός may exist in the embryo, 
but cannot fulfil its function to see “all things” (πάντα) (430a15) without the “light” of 
the νοῦς ποιητικóς.
The decisive conclusion is, therefore, that there is, in Aristotle, no personal 
immortality of the individual, but only of the depersonalized νοῦς ποιητικóς on the one 
hand and the eternal species on the other hand. The νοῦς ποιητικóς exists as a general 
νοῦς, be it divine or not; the eternal species exist by reproduction of the individuals: “an 
animal producing an animal, a plant a plant, in order that, as far as its nature allows, it may 
partake in the eternal and divine” (de An. II.415.28-415b1). The survival of one individual 
soul, with its images, we have only in the shadowy memory of its progeny. Although the 
textual evidence for this interpretation is small, the complete mortality of human beings 
and their souls is in accordance with the picture, in Aristotle, of a soul as forma corporis.
25 I owe “essentially” to Caston, “Aristotle’s Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal,” op. cit., 211.
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III
So, the immortality of the personal soul remained for Aristotle, in De Anima, and in 
distinction to Plato – as it was for his Socrates in the Meno (81a10-b7) – not “an old and 
holy saying” (παλαιοῖς τε καὶ ἱεροῖς λόγοις) (Ep. VII, 335a3) to be obeyed. Nevertheless, 
the Platonic Love (cf. Smp. 207d-208d) in the sense of a “désir de l’éternité”26 did not die 
in Aristotle:
But we must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human 
things, and, being mortal, of mortal things, but must, so far as we can (ἐφ’ 
ὅσον ἐνδέχεται), make ourselves immortal (ἀθανατίζειν), and strain every 
nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us; for even if it be small 
in bulk (τῷ ὄγκῳ σμικρόν), much more does it in power and worth surpass 
everything (δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει). This 
would seem, too, to be each man himself, since it is the authoritative and 
better part of him. It would be strange, then, if he were to choose not the life 
of his self but that of something else. And what we said before will apply 
now; that which is proper to each thing is by nature best and most pleasant 
for each thing; for man, therefore, the life according to reason (κατὰ τὸν νοῦν) 
is best and pleasantest, since reason more than anything else is man. This 
life therefore is also the happiest (EN, X10, 1177b30-1178a8; transl. Smith).
This desire for immortality by assimilation of ourselves to the νοῦς, echoes not only 
the follow -up of the Platonic formula ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, namely πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει 
ὑπερέχοντος (R. 509b9-10), since the νοῦς “in power and worth surpasses everything” 
(δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει). It echoes also the phrase “becoming 
as like God as possible” (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν) (Tht. 176b1-3, cf. Ti. 90d4-9) in 
the sense of a ὁμοίωσις νῷi κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.
But this “désir de l’éternité” nevertheless leaves open the question of post-
 -mortem justice regarding our moral or immoral behaviour as long as we are alive. This 
is unsatisfactory because even if the just are simpliciter happy and the unjust unhappy 
(Grg. 470c-471d, R. 618e-619b, Lg. 662b -e) in this life,27 the just may nevertheless have 
in a qualified sense a miserable life and may, like Socrates – “the best of that generation 
we’ve ever encountered, the wisest, too, and the most just” (Phd. 118a; transl. Rowe) – be 
condemned to death, whereas the most unjust may survive. But then a “need of reason” 
(Vernunftbedürfnis) (cf. Critique of Practical Reason, A 256-258) remains unfulfilled, 
namely that the just also have on earth a happy life or that virtue also pays in the end 
26 L. Robin, La thérie platonicienne de l’amour, nouvelle édition avec préface de P.-M. Schuhl (Paris: s.n., 1964), 
188: “L’amour n’est pas seulement (...) l’amour de la possession éternelle du bon; il est l’amour de l’éternité même, 
parce qu’elle est un bien et même notre bien.”
27 Cf. R. Ferber, “Was und wie hat Sokrates gewusst?,” Elenchos 28, 2007, 38: “Sokrates’ ‘semantischer Monismus’, 
dagegen würde darauf insistieren, daß die Ausdrücke ‘glücklich,’ ‘gerecht’ und ‘gut’ nur auf eine Art und Weise 
korrekt verwendet werden oder nur eine korrekte Bedeutung haben und alle anderen Verwendungsweisen 
inkorrekt sind: Der Gerechte ist simpliciter glücklich, der Ungerechte dagegen simpliciter unglücklich, (...) und das 
Angenehme ist simpliciter nicht das Gute.”
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in terms of (conventional) happiness in this life. In Kantian terminology, it is a “need 
of reason” that the good will or bonum supremum is supplemented by the bonum 
consummatum, that is, that the good will is supplemented by happiness (cf. Critique of 
Practical Reason, A 198-203).
It is the Christian belief in the resurrection of a “spiritual body” (σῶμα πνευματικóν) 
(1 Corinthians: 15, 44) – to be judged for one’s good and bad deeds in life (cf. 2 Corinthians: 
5, 10) – after the complete annihilation of body and soul28 which has the advantage of 
giving substance to this “need of reason” in a new form. But with this “spiritual body” 
(σῶμα πνευματικóν), we would leave the limits of philosophy, since this resurrection 
of my “psychic body” (σῶμα ψυχικóν), which will be buried, in a post -resurrectional 
“spiritual body” (σῶμα πνευματικóν) (cf. 1 Corinthians: 15, 44-45) – which is nevertheless 
numerically identical with my “pychic body” – cannot be proved by reason any more than 
its presupposition – the resurrection of Christ – can be proved by direct evidence (cf. 1 
Corinthians: 15, 12-14). It remains a testimony -based “knowledge,” in Platonic terms, 
a belief without knowledge (ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξα (c.f. R. 506c6) – that is, a belief (δόξα) 
transformed by St. Paul into a faith (πίστις) on the same scale as hope (ἐλπίς) and love 
(ἀγάπη) (cf. 1 Corinthians: 13, 13).
But even if the testimony is false, the resurrection in a “spiritual body” remains – 
like Plato’s myths of the beyond (Gr. 523a-527a, Phd. 107d-114c, Plt. 614b-621b; cf. also 
Lg. 903d-903e) – a reasonable myth, whose reasonable core, in the sense of a “need of 
reason”, transformed into a firm hope, had long before Kant already been formulated 
by “the Socrates in the Phaedo”: “that there is something in store for those who have 
died, and – as we have been told since antiquity – something much better for the good 
than for the bad” (Phd. 63c5-7; transl. Rowe with small alterations by R. F.). Perhaps this 
reasonable hope of a post -mortem justice, effected by a post -mortem tribunal, consisting – 
in a secularized form – of the judgments of future generations of children “asking to be 
born” (Leonard Cohen), will enhance justice here and now in this life, at least for the part 
of mankind who believe in future generations of children. But, in distinction to a belief 
in a post -resurrectional “spiritual body” (σῶμα πνευματικóν), a belief in future children 
is true of (almost) everybody.
To vary the motto of Goethe’s Farbenlehre (“Post fata nostra pueri qui nunc 
ludunt nostri iudices erunt.”): “Post fata nostra infantes nondum nati nostri iudices erunt”; 
or, translated freely: “After our fortunes, the children not yet born will be our judges, 
regarding our fortunes and deeds.”29
28 Cf. O. Cullmann, Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead? The Witnesses of the New Testament 
(London: Epworth Press, 1958).
29 An earlier version of the paper was given at the National Research University “Higher School of Economics,” 
Moscow, April 2017. I thank very much Olga Alieva for her invitation, two commentators and Hubertus Busche for 
their helpful comments.
